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Abstract
Wireless local area networks are particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks due to their
contested transmission medium. Access point spoofing, route poisoning, and cryptographic
attacks are some of the many mature threats faced by wireless networks. Recent work
investigates physical-layer features such as received signal strength or radio frequency
fingerprinting to identify and localize malicious devices. This thesis demonstrates a
novel and complementary approach to exploiting physical-layer differences among wireless
devices that is more energy efficient and invariant with respect to the environment than
traditional fingerprinting techniques. Specifically, this methodology exploits subtle design
differences among different transceiver hardware types.
A software defined radio captures packets with standard-length IEEE 802.11b
preambles, manipulates the recorded preambles by shortening their length, then replays the
altered packets toward the transceivers under test. Wireless transceivers vary in their ability
to receive packets with preambles shorter than the standard. By analyzing differences in
packet reception with respect to preamble length, this methodology distinguishes amongst
eight transceiver types from three manufacturers. All tests to successfully enumerate the
transceivers achieve accuracy rates greater than 99%, while transmitting less than 60 test
packets.
This research extends previous work illustrating RF fingerprinting techniques through
IEEE 802.15.4 wireless protocols. The results demonstrate that preamble manipulation is
effective for multi-factor device authentication, network intrusion detection, and remote
transceiver type fingerprinting in IEEE 802.11b.
iv
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RADIO FREQUENCY FINGERPRINTING TECHNIQUES
THROUGH PREAMBLE MODIFICATION IN IEEE 802.11B
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Wireless technologies represent a field of continual evolution, providing Internet
access to homes and businesses. This widespread propagation acts as the catalyst of the
digital information age. Electronic commerce represents a multi-billion dollar industry.
Social media connects millions across the planet. The Internet opens a new domain usable
by anyone with access to a computer with Ethernet, fiber optic or other wireless capabilities.
The explosive growth of wireless technologies that provide access to the Internet
presents a series of unique security challenges. Several developments in sound security
practices address these issues. Attackers exploit a feature in the data link layer of the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, which permits arbitrary Media Access Control
(MAC) assignment in a wireless transceiver. The abuse of unique digital identifiers, known
as “MAC spoofing”, leads to potential malicious activity. One of the most significant
challenges today addresses how to thwart would-be attackers from abusing arbitrary MAC
assignment.
There exist creative solutions that take advantage of independent manufacturing, with
respect to wireless transceivers. This thesis explores the potential to enumerate hardware
devices that provide wireless connectivity to the Internet. Successful device classification
suggests a deterministic approach that compares transceiver performance with the expected
outcome for the corresponding MAC address. Theoretically, the solution to combat MAC
spoofing is to simply validate the MAC address.
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1.2 Hypothesis
If transceivers differ in their response to a series of packets containing modified
preambles, the packet response rates characterizing each transceiver suggests the possibility
of device classification. Prior to handling received wireless traffic, transceivers listen
for a preamble to perform a series of network synchronization functions. If the
window to perform these functions diminishes, there exists the possibility that network
synchronization fails and the transceiver drops the altered packet. Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines standards applicable to the IEEE 802.11 protocol,
however the standard does not reach the level of specificity to dictate physical layer
implementation. This research hypothesizes that if wireless transceivers respond differently
upon receipt of a packet containing a modified preamble, RF fingerprinting is possible.
1.3 Research Goals
The overall goal of this research is to perform device classification over IEEE
802.11b (hereafter referred to as “802.11b”), utilizing an RF fingerprinting technique.
This research analyzes behavioral differences in various wireless transceivers to discern
the prospect of device classification. In addition, the research also seeks to accurately
determine transceiver types efficiently by minimizing the required number of packets to
successfully enumerate a transceiver. In order to achieve these goals, multiple experiments
are conducted to generate a transceiver profile and gauge the probability of packet response
to manipulated preambles.
1.4 Scope of Research
Pursuant to the goals of this research, there exist a series of assumptions that bind the
scope of this experiment. The collective pool of eight transceivers represent three large
scale manufacturers: Atheros, Broadcom and Intel. Other manufacturers that produce
wireless transceivers are unobtainable through cost–effective means. Packet response
2
rates during the experiment extend exclusively to 802.11b. The tests utilize standard
long preambles within 802.11b, as opposed to the optional shorter preamble. Network
conditions include four to six other wireless access points operating between 2.412 -
2.462 Gigahertz (GHz). Preamble modifications range from a single bit up to ten bits
and packet replays occur through the National Instruments Ettus Universal Software Radio
Peripheral (USRP).
1.5 Execution
Each transceiver transmits a series of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo
requests to a wireless access point. The USRP captures the RF signals and creates a binary
file, which contains the instantaneous amplitude readings for the RF signals. MATLAB
software provides a graphical user interface to plot the data, identify the region of interest
and alter the specific samples to create the trial test packets. The experiment comprises
of ten sets of packets, each set removes another bit from the preamble. Once created, the
USRP retransmits the modified RF signals back to the transceiver. Wireshark monitors
network traffic on the transceiver under test to account for positive and negative responses
to each transmission. Section 3.2.2 covers the detailed approach concerning this research.
1.6 Thesis Layout
This chapter addresses the motivation, hypothesis, assumptions and goals of this
research. This chapter also briefly describes the experimental design. Chapter 2 covers the
literature review and also highlights related research efforts that parallel this methodology,
summarizing their results. Chapter 3 discusses the experimental design of this research and
illustrates how the experiments are executed. Chapter 4 provides statistical analysis of the
experimental results. Chapter 5 reports the conclusions of the findings, and identifies where
future research can expand the prospect of device classification through RF fingerprinting
techniques.
3
II. Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses several topics pertinent to RF fingerprinting. Section
2.2 provides an introduction to the 802.11 protocol specification and defines unique
characteristics of specific protocols. Section 2.3 defines several specifications that hardware
devices must fulfill to meet the standards of 802.11b. Section 2.4 illustrates frame classes
and relationships between states. Section 2.5 details the relationship between the data
link and physical layers, as headers and trailers are appended to wireless network traffic.
In addition, Section 2.5 also details preambles in 802.11, network synchronization and
channel estimation. Section 2.6 introduces the technical specifications of the National
Instruments USRP. Section 2.7 addresses security concerns stemming from arbitrary
MAC address assignment. Section 2.8 describes prior existing techniques to validate MAC
addresses and also analyzes potential technical solutions within preamble modifications.
2.2 Advent of Wireless Technologies
During the 1990s, commercial and residential networks increasingly connected to the
Internet. Telephone lines failed to provide the necessary bandwidth for users to access
complex web-pages or download multimedia from the Internet [KRT02]. This resulted in
lag and lengthy delays, while the requested resources buffered through the line strained
at the maximum throughput rate of 56 Kbps [KuR10]. Consumer demand transitioned
to a more favorable Internet connection with cable and Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL),
which offered 15 times greater bandwidth for information to flow. At the same time, laptop
computing became popular in the office environment for their portability.
Mobile computing ignited the demand for mobile connectivity, an ability to operate
free of cables and utilize Radio Frequency (RF) to send and receive data. Initially, two
4
separate standards were developed. The European Telecommunications Standard Institute
(ETSI) developed the High Performance Local Area Network (HIPERLAN) [DAB+02].
Meanwhile, the IEEE developed the currently–accepted standards of the 802.11 families,
which included the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). The 802.11 standard gained
widespread acceptance and subsequently resulted in the demise of HIPERLAN.
As shown in Table 2.1, IEEE 802.11 operates exclusively on the 2.4 GHz band
[Voc12]. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread
Spectrum (FHSS) provide two modulation techniques, enabling the transmission rates of 1
or 2 Mbps. In September 1999, 802.11a was ratified, dramatically increasing the available
throughput of the original 802.11 standard. 802.11a utilized Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiplexing (OFDM). Operating at 5 GHz as opposed to the traditional 2.4 GHz
range mitigates packet loss and collisions, since more hosts and access points still utilize
the 2.4 GHz frequency. IEEE ratified the 802.11b standard in September 1999, around the
same time as 802.11a. Despite a maximum throughput of 11 Mbps, as opposed to 54 Mbps
in 802.11a, the 802.11b standard performs better at lower speeds and does not lose signal
strength through absorption as easily [KuR10].
Table 2.1: 802.11, 802.11a and 802.11b Specifications
2.3 IEEE 802.11 Distribution System Services
All access points and their respective clients that transmit data in the wireless
medium must provide services in accordance to IEEE 802.11. Clients that utilize 802.11
facilitate services, including: association, disassociation, distribution, integration and re-
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association. Critical to this research, IEEE does not specify how a message is sent in a
distributed system. The Distribution System Services (DSS) association, re-association and
disassociation services determine the desired recipient when sending a message. This fact
leaves independent manufacturers the open forum to design their respective transceivers to
accomplish distribution however they see fit [CBC06]. Comparative analysis, covered more
in Section 4.3, concludes derivations between independent manufacturers with respect to
packet response. The deviations are attributable to the open implementation specifications
set forth by IEEE.
2.4 Frame Classes in IEEE 802.11
There are two variables that all stations must manage, defined by the 802.11 standard.
These variables, authentication and association, categorize the Station (STA) into one of
three potential states. The standard further defines a series of class frames that each
state may invoke. Depending on the associated state, these frames provide rudimentary
service functions for authentication and association. As the STA transitions from an
unauthenticated/unassociated to an authenticated/associated state, the frames the STA
is able to transmit increases. Sections 2.4.1–2.4.3 describe the three states in detail,
including the corresponding class frames associated to each state. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the relationship between the three states.
2.4.1 State 1: Unauthenticated, Unassociated.
State 1 represents the initial state that all STA’s begin. In this state, the STA may invoke
a limited set of frames that allow the STA to identify an Access Point (AP), Extended
Service Set (ESS) or WLAN to associate with. In addition, State 1 grants the STA the
ability to perform the necessary functions to authenticate to any of the aforementioned.
Unsuccessful authentication denies the STA the ability to transition to State 2, where
association takes place. The permitted frames exchanged in State 1 are indicated as “Class
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1” frames, respectively. These frames provides STAs the ability to complete authentication
services and identify APs on the LAN.
2.4.2 State 2: Authenticated, Unassociated.
A STA transitions to State 2 upon successful authentication in State 1. In this state,
the class of permitted frames to exchange expands to include association, disassociation
and re–association capabilities. In addition, a STA in State 2 may receive a de–
authentication notification. Subsequently, upon receipt of a de–authentication notification,
the STA returns to State 1. Class 2 frames include all of Class 1 frames, as well as the
association capabilities and de–authentication notifications. Upon successful completion
of association, the STA transitions to State 3.
2.4.3 State 3: Authenticated, Associated.
State 3 defines a STA that contains true boolean values for both authentication and
association. State 3 permits the transmission of all frame types. Within State 3, STAs
transition back down to State 2 upon receipt of disassociation notifications and State 1
upon receipt of de–authentication notifications. If a STA receives a frame from another
STA that is not authenticated, the receiving STA transmits a de–authentication notification
to the sending STA. This forces the unauthenticated STA to return to State 1. Similarly,
an unassociated STA transmitting Class 3 frames will receive a disassociation notification
to force the return to State 2 [OHP05]. During this research, the STA’s that manage
each of the transceivers utilize data delivery service to send and receive data. The trials
conducted within this experiment operate in State 3. Section 3.4.1 – 3.4.3 elaborate on the
experimental methodology that references data delivery services.
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Figure 2.1: Relationship Between 802.11 States 1-3
2.5 Data Link Layer and Physical Layers
2.5.1 Sub-Layer Interaction.
There are multiple layers that pass data in the IEEE 802.11 standard. A unit of data
takes on various names, depending on where the data resides on the computer networking
model. Figure 2.2 depicts the relationship between the data link and physical layers. Data
received from the network layer down to the Logic Link Control (LLC), the upper sub-
region inside the data link layer, denotes the MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU). Before
the MSDU is passed down to the Physical Layer (PHY) layer, a 30-byte MAC header and
4-byte Frame Check Sequence (FCS) encapsulate the MSDU, creating the MAC Protocol
Data Unit (MPDU).
Once the MPDU traverses the MAC layer, a sub-region inside the data link layer, the
MPDU enters the PHY layer, where it is referred to as the Physical Layer Service Data
Unit (PSDU). The Physical Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) encapsulates the PSDU
with the preamble and padding the same way the MAC header and FCS encapsulate the
MSDU in the data link layer. This data unit, known as the Physical Layer Protocol Data
Unit (PPDU), is managed and handled by the PHY layer [IEE99].
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Figure 2.2: Relationship Between Network, Data-Link and Physical Layers
The PLCP and Physical Medium Dependent (PMD) sub-layers comprise the PHY
layer. These two regions support PHY layer functionality similar to how the LLC and MAC
sub-layers augment data link operations. The PLCP handles Clear Channel Assessment
(CCA) and bridging MAC sub-layer communications. CCA techniques include Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) as well as Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD). These functions regulate the nodes
to ensure the availability of the channel before transmitting [FLM10]. The head of the
PPDU contains the PLCP preamble, which sub-divides into the synchronization and Start
Frame Delimiter (SFD) [Mol05].
2.5.2 Physical Layer Transmission Properties.
802.11b standard physical layer supports transmission speeds of 1 and 2 Mega–bits per
second (Mbps). Utilizing DSSS, these speeds operate either through Dynamic Binary Phase
Shift Keying (DBPSK) and Dynamic Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK) modulation
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techniques. DSSS also provides 5.5 and 11 Mbps speeds, by chipping the baseband signal
with an 11-chip pseudo-noise code. As speeds near maximum throughput on 802.11b,
the effective range of transmission diminishes as well as packet reception. Dynamic rate
shifting techniques allow 802.11b to adjust the speed of transmission automatically, striking
equilibrium between efficient throughput and minimizing packet loss.
2.5.3 Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum PLCP Frame.
802.11b traffic follows the DSSS model. This transmission method differs from FHSS
and OFDM. Figure 2.3 illustrates how DSSS transmits the RF signal over the range of a
spectrum, rather than a narrow-band signal. The DSSS PLCP frame contains the preamble,
header and PSDU. All of these fields process through a scrambling algorithm prior to
transmission as the PMD, as opposed to FHSS models that only scrambles the PSDU (MAC
frame).
Figure 2.3: Example of DSSS Frequency Response [Ell08]
In 802.11b, DSSS transmits the preamble through either long or short synchronization.
The former contains a 144-bit preamble, which comprises of a 128-bit synchronization field
10
followed by the 16-bit SFD. All 802.11b devices must support standard long preambles.
The alternative shorter preamble reduces the synchronization field to 56 bits, which
provides greater efficiency for specialized network traffic such as VoIP or real-time media
streaming. Most 802.11b devices also support the shorter preamble standard [Erg02].
Within the standard long preamble, the synchronization field, SFD and PLCP headers
transmit through DBPSK at 1 Mbps. The remaining traffic after the preamble and header
transmits at rates best suited for their environments [MEG08]. Higher reliability, albeit
lower throughput, include DBPSK (1 Mbps) and DQPSK (2 Mbps). Complementary
Code Keying (CCK) or Packet Binary Convolution Coding (PBCC) enables the highest
throughput of 5.5/11 Mbps.
Figure 2.4 depicts the packet structure of the long preamble this experiment utilizes.
The long synchronization field of the preamble comprises of 128 scrambled bits. The
SFD indicates the end of the preamble through a specialized sequence of bits, 1111 0011
1010 0000. To avoid ambiguity, the order of transmission reads from right to left as a
result of least-significant bit. The long synchronization fields SFD differs from the short
synchronization field by reversing the value of the long SFD [Gas05].
Following the preamble, the PLCP frame contains the four-field header that specifies
information about the packet. The signal field is an 8-bit field that identifies the speed
of transmission for the packet. Long preambles contain four possible values: 1 Mbps, 2
Mbps, 5.5 Mbps or 11 Mbps. The service field carries little relevance to the impact of
this experiment, however this 8 bit field contains the values of clock lock and modulation
techniques. Additionally, the last bit in the service field serves as an extension to the length
field, which specifies how many microseconds are required to transmit the MAC frame.
Lastly, the CRC creates the checksum as a result of the values within the PLCP header.
This ensures the integrity of the header remains intact to signal lost bits during transmission
[CSS11].
11
Figure 2.4: PLCP Long Preamble Structure [IEE99]
2.6 National Instruments Universal Software Radio Peripheral
National Instruments produces various software defined radios that provide record
and playback capabilities. The USRP provides a cost effective technical solution to
conduct experiments, while maintaining the integrity of the RF signal. As opposed to
other hardware devices that offer comparable performance, the USRP’s small size lends to
portability and enables testing from the convenience of personal workspace. Housed inside
the USRP–2921, the transceiver operates a direct conversion transmitter and receiver. The
USRP–2921 model operates within the 2.4–2.5 GHz and 4.9–5.9 GHz range, the two RF
spectrums utilized by IEEE 802.11 protocols [IEE99].
Section 3.3 discusses specific implementation, but the overall capabilities of the record
and playback follow three primary components: p (t) = r (t) = s (t). p (t) represents the
playback signal, which the host machine provides, running the LabView software that
manages the USRP. r (t) represents the recorded signal captured by the USRP device.
s (t) represents the desired signal to record. Ideal conditions preserve the integrity of
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the recorded signal and the playback signal, however various sources produce external
interference.
Accounting for interference that exists in the wireless medium, the previous equation
transforms into: p (t) = ns (t) = s (t) + n (t) + i (t). p (t) still represents the playback
signal. However, s (t) now contains noise present on the channel as well as environmental
interference. Additionally, the actual devices themselves also produce noise, accounted for
by ns (t).
Noise takes on multiple forms in the electromagnetic spectrum. Noise occurs from
poor shielding around cables, present between the host machine managing the USRP and
the actual device itself. This effect also occurs around loose connections and other antennas
lacking proper configuration. Figure 2.5 represents how other devices operating within
relative channel and physical proximity produce noise, known as co–channel interference,
which degrades the quality of the signal. Bluetooth devices also operate within the 2.4
GHz - 2.4835 GHz range. Wireless devices operating strategically on channels: 1, 6 and 11
reduces the amount of co–channel interference. However 802.11b cannot avoid potential
interference with Bluetooth devices, which employs FHSS.
In addition to noise on the channel, environmental interference also impacts the quality
of the signal. Multipath propagation occurs when segments of an RF signal take paths of
varying lengths prior to reaching the receiver, generally as a result of a physical obstruction
or reflection off a surface. Multipath propagation also occurs in mobile networks where
the sender or receiver are mobile. This phenomenon deteriorates the signal, producing a
blurring effect once reaching the receiver. Lastly, although not relevant to this research,
signal quality decreases when transmitted to distant receivers.
During recording, the USRP captures the playback signal with external interference.
The USRP contains a fixed 40 MHz internal input bandwidth, driven by the 20 MHz
antialiasing lowpass filters on the “I” and “Q” values. These two values represent the in–
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Figure 2.5: Diagram of Co–Channel Interference
phase and quadrature values during the digitization phase. During the digitization phase,
the recorded signal is transmitted through the gigabit Ethernet cable where the host machine
writes the data. LabView saves each sample, which includes the “I” and “Q” values, as
16–bit integers inside a vector. Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 further cover the processing and
plotting of data to perform preamble modifications.
In addition to external interference, the recorded RF signal experiences subtle
deterioration as a result of physical limitations associated with the USRP. As indicated
in Section 2.5.3, 802.11b operates through DSSS, which utilizes the entire band. DSSS
comprises of the primary signal known as the “main lobe”, and sideband lobes that transmit
at reduced power to mitigate adjacent channel interference. Spectral density depends on the
distance from the center frequency, which is defined by the IEEE standard. Transmissions
within 11 MHz of the frequency center (main lobe) remain unfiltered. Sideband lobes
contain the secondary signals adjacent to the main lobe, which operate between 11–22
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MHz away from the frequency center. These filtered signals transmit at –30 Decibels (dB).
Anything beyond ± 22 MHz from the frequency center transmits at –50 dB.
Figure 2.6 illustrates an RF sample utilizing DSSS to denote the region of potential
loss of signal. The relationship between spectral density and the distance from the
frequency center illustrate that DSSS transmits most of the data within the main lobe.
Sideband lobes extend ± 22 MHz away from the center frequency, however the USRP is
physically limited by the 20 MHz antialiasing lowpass filters. This means that there exists
a small region at both ends of the signal where signal loss occurs, reducing the quality of
the recorded and playback signal [Nat12].
Figure 2.6: USRP Physical Limits on 802.11b Spectral Mask
2.7 Security Concerns Stemming from Arbitrary MAC Address Assignment
The wireless spectrum is a contested medium that offers portability and mobile
network computing. Abuse of unique digital identifiers, such as MAC addresses,
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introduces enticing conditions that lead to cybercrime. The resulting anonymity
of masquerading legitimate devices lends itself to the assumption of avoiding legal
repercussions. Cybercrime costs businesses millions in revenue and trends indicate an
increase in abuse of cyber through Ethernet and wireless spectrums [Pon12]. Arbitrary
MAC address assignment raises concerns because it affects the information security model:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Earlier detection of MAC spoofing provides
system administrators an opportunity to isolate the threat and prevent a myriad of potential
attacks, enabled through the abuse of unique digital identifiers.
2.7.1 ARP Cache Poisoning.
Man–in–the–Middle (MITM) situations can occur as a result of a successful Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning attack. There are other possibilities also
directly attributable to MITM operations. Local Area Networks (LAN) employ ARP,
which manages the list of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to MAC addresses. Any client
can initiate an ARP request to find where to appropriately route LAN traffic. Security
concerns stem from the fact that the ARP protocol performs absolutely no authentication
when a host receives an ARP reply. This creates a situation where any client connected
to the LAN can issue arbitrary ARP replies that create a MITM attack. An attacker
can subsequently sniff traffic passed between hosts any other host including the gateway
[FlD01].
ARP cache poisoning also leads to potential denial attacks through MAC flooding.
Figure 2.7 depicts both normal network conditions and the MITM attack. An attacker
bombards the LAN with a series of ARP replies that cause a switch to act as a hub. This
broadcasts all network traffic to all hosts associated with the LAN, which defeats port
security implementations. Alternatively, the attacker can launch a denial of service attack
by creating a half-duplex connection between the clients and gateway, disrupting services
on the LAN [BXY+06].
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Figure 2.7: Diagram of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
2.7.2 Domain Name System Poisoning.
Attackers that successfully masquerade as legitimate users through MAC spoofing
techniques further gain leverage through Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning. At a
high level, the attacker spoofs their MAC address to gain access to a wireless network.
A MITM attack allows the attacker to bridge communication between the victim and
access point. DNS poisoning occurs when the victim enters a DNS request, but is given a
malicious IP. An attacker employs the use of a proxy to intercept specific web traffic and
change the properties before forwarding the response back to the victim. Burp proxy is a
graphical user interface–based tool that provides such a capability [Bur14]. Additionally,
the attacker may be able to win the race to respond to a DNS query and provide a malicious
IP before the legitimate DNS response is received. In either event, DNS poisoning enables
the attacker to pivot and further gain leverage onto a network [TVP10].
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2.8 Related Research
There exist related research efforts that explore RF fingerprinting techniques for
security purposes. Each method contains strengths and weaknesses to detect, isolate
and mitigate potential attacks. Areas of research include Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI)–based analysis, Sequence Number Rate Analysis (SNRA) intra–cellular
security using RF fingerprints, and device enumeration in IEEE 802.15.4 wireless protocols
[RMT13]. In addition, spectral fingerprinting research efforts conducted in IEEE 802.11a
yield moderately successful results analyzing SNRA [STM08]. Research efforts focus on
the performance of physical hardware specifications in non–transient networks to contrast
transceivers under test.
2.8.1 Intra–Cellular Security and RF Fingerprints.
Air monitoring applications provide additional security using RF fingerprints. Cellular
wireless communications utilize the same contested medium, posing threats through
unauthorized use of unique digital identities. The security paradigm hinges on the technical
aspect of physical layer security, since spoofing is extraordinarily difficult. Related research
indicates unintentional changes to the signal as a result of hardware implementation and
component manufacturing. These changes include characteristics that affect frequency,
phase and amplitude. Statistical analysis compares the characteristics of each of the
manufacturers between standard deviation, variance, skewness and kurtosis. This related
research concludes that intra–cellular security is feasible, citing similar methodologies
employed in OFDM–based 802.11a signals analysis [RTM10].
2.8.2 MAC Spoofing Detection through RSSI.
The essence of RSSI research includes multiple sensors within a LAN that observe
signal strength received from a transceiver, following packet transmission. Figure 2.8
models a simple RSSI diagram. Each sensor shares their data with adjacent neighbors
to create an RF fingerprint based on observed signal strength. If a sensor receives an RF
18
fingerprint that is inconsistent with the characteristics of a known device’s fingerprint, this
triggers an alert. The device in question may be quarantined until further analyzed by a
network or system administrator.
Variations exist on received signal strength, largely due to environmental interference.
Factors that impact the quality of the signal include other communicating devices operating
on the same channel, obstructions between two receivers, atmospheric conditions, even
the curvature of the Earth. Irrespective the external interference, in a LAN where the
sender remains in a stationary position, multiple samples from the RSSI produce a valid
RF fingerprint. The RSSI model compares these fingerprints and performs real-time
statistical analysis to discern differences in the behavioral properties to detect potential
MAC spoofing. Based on computational algorithms, RSSI models create a “dB profile” to
serve as a baseline for acceptance [STC08].
Figure 2.8: Example of Received Signal Strength Indicator Model
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RSSI models demonstrate favorable properties for RF fingerprinting. The RSSIs
prove difficult if not impossible to impersonate, since attackers do not have enough
control over the signal strength to compensate for environmental conditions. Depending
on the distribution of the sensors within the model, RSSI possesses strong correlation
to the physical location of a transceiver [MGS10]. Network and system administrators
control the sensitivity of the RSSI model, providing a fulcrum between security and
functionality. Lastly, the model performs with high consistency on stationary transceivers.
This significantly reduces variation on dB levels of RSSIs and mitigates false positive
readings.
Limitations exist within the RSSI model, especially with mobile computing.
Transceivers that operate on mobile devices prohibit the ability for sensors to construct
valid RF fingerprints. This differs from stationary platforms, since sensor networks obtain
the same RSSI values when conducting multiple tests. As such, RSSI–based approaches
work best in static environments where the locality of each station remains consistent
[Wri03].
2.8.3 MAC Spoofing Detection through SNRA.
SNRA–based methods analyze a key field within an IEEE 802.11 frame. The sequence
control frame contains a 16-bit field divided between the 12-bit sequence number and the
4-bit fragment number. The IEEE 802.11 frame employs a standard FCS that detects
corrupted or altered bits. Additionally, the ability to generate arbitrary sequence numbers
in IEEE 802.11 traffic is not as trivialized as changing the MAC address on a wireless
transceiver.
The 12-bit sequence number field equates to a range of values that initialize at zero
and increment until 4095, before wrapping around to zero. Successfully received packets
increment the sequence number, which facilitates the filtering of duplicate traffic on the
wireless network. This predictable pattern of incrementing sequence numbers yields
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advantages to both network attackers and defenders. SNRA–based methods analyze the
differences in sequence numbers to detect MAC spoofing. A simple algorithm calculates
the differences between two frames and accounts for the wrap-around that occurs once the
sequence resets from 4095 to 0. Lastly, the detection algorithm provides a measure of
flexibility in the event that packets are received out of order.
For example, if the detection algorithm sets the out-of-order threshold to 4090 or
greater. Any differences in sequence numbers between two frames greater than 4090 are
treated as legitimate traffic that arrived out of order. Naturally, there exists the possibility
that MAC spoofing occurred relative to these values. However, based on 10,337 registered
prefixes out of a total possible 16,777,216 MAC prefixes, the odds of MAC spoofing
activity based on random sequence number assignment stands at 0.0006% [IEE14].
Two known methods exist to extract the sequence number from the MAC header.
The first method includes the modification of the WLAN interface driver for both the
access point and all associated stations. This method allows for both the detection
and prevention of MAC spoofing, however the primary drawback is the modification of
firmware in a commercial access point requires extensive technical knowledge. Employing
a WLAN monitor offers an easier method to leverage the sequence number from the
MAC header. When these systems operate in monitor mode, they receive all IEEE
802.11 traffic, irrespective the operating channel. Consequently, these monitor system that
operate separate from the network do not possess the capabilities to prevent MAC spoofing
[GuC06].
MAC spoofing detection through SNRA–based techniques monitor sequence number
gap differences similarly the way this research isolates and identifies 802.11b bursts of
traffic in MATLAB. A difference that does not meet the criteria of a wrap-around scenario
or out-of-order sequence strongly suggests that MAC spoofing has occurred. Ultimately,
the ability to avoid detection from SNRA based techniques requires extensive knowledge
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of the target’s sequence number and precision timing techniques to align with anticipated
IEEE 802.11 traffic.
The primary limitations of SNRA–based techniques include the overhead cost of
maintaining software to track assigned MAC addresses to their current transmitted
sequence numbers. Similar to RSSI models, mobile networking introduces challenges
with SNRA approaches. Clients that roam out of the range of the network discontinue
transmitting their respective sequence numbers. When the clients return, SNRA–based
models observe a jump in sequence numbers, which triggers a response of potential
malicious traffic. Timing delays mitigate false positives by establishing a threshold from
which a client re-associating with the network is assumed to have roamed out of range for
a temporary period of time [GuC06].
2.8.4 MAC Spoofing Detection through Secondary Authentication.
Secondary authentication methods provide alternative security approaches to address
the issue of arbitrary MAC assignment, a flaw in the data–link layer of the OSI model.
Related research explores security models that augment intrusion detection by comparing
the hashes of legitimate users against unknown users. In this process, a legitimate user
creates a psuedo–fingerprint that identifies properties unique to the user such as: MAC
address, central processing unit identification and computer name. The user combines
these properties, generates a hash and passes the authentication frame to the access point.
When a new user requests to associate to the network, they pass an authentication
frame to the access point. Network association occurs if the access control list validates
the hash of the authenticating frame. Additional security procedures include periodic re–
authentication to the network and disassociation from the network after multiple failed re–
authentication attempts. While the security model elevates the level of difficulty to spoof
legitimate MAC addresses, re-authentication lockouts create denial of service opportunities
against legitimate users on the network. [BhA12]
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2.8.5 MAC Spoofing Detection through Prefix Validation.
IEEE maintains the vendor prefix that comprises the first three octets in a MAC
address. This list is similar to DNS lookups, which provides registration information
[IEE14]. Simple scripting languages obtain the MAC address of clients that connect to
an access point from a predefined dictionary updated by IEEE. MAC validation prohibits
the use of randomly assigned MAC addresses from authenticating to the network. This
methodology provides very minimal security for networks, since MAC validation only
asserts that the first three octets of a client exist on the organizationally unique identifier
maintained by IEEE.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the experimental setup and design configurations to enumerate
the RF fingerprint of each device. Section 3.2 describes the problem definition, goals,
approaches, system boundaries and system services. Section 3.3 explains the experimental
design, workload parameters, system parameters and factors. Section 3.4 describes
the design and configuration of the experiment. Section 3.5 summarizes the overall
methodology.
3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Goals.
This experiment explores the possibility to perform RF fingerprinting by analyzing
transceiver response rates to a series of modified preamble trials. Initial hypothesis
suggests that shortening the preamble of 802.11b traffic reduces the transceiver’s ability
to perform network synchronization. This causes the transceivers to respond differently.
Fingerprinting each difference in response can be used to identify each device. The
overarching goal is to correctly identify a unique transceiver communicating with a wireless
AP operating in 802.11b. Successful identification is contingent upon several questions that
this experiment addresses:
1. Does there exist the ability to capture, alter and replay 802.11b wireless traffic?
2. Do wireless transceivers respond differently to altered wireless traffic?
3. If so, are the responses unique enough to perform device classification?
3.2.2 Approach.
The system, named the Signals eXploitation System (SXS), addresses each goal
by creating a small wireless network and performing controlled tests on each of the
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transceivers. Several integral components provide specific functions throughout the trials.
An arbitrary waveform generator (National Instruments USRP–2921) performs the packet
capture and replay. MATLAB software displays a graphical user interface to interact with
the captured data. Further, MATLAB is used in this research to alter the vector representing
the RF fingerprint. Combining these elements, SXS tests how the transceivers respond to
varying preamble lengths. The results of packet response to each of the trials determines
whether or not device classification is possible.
3.2.3 System Boundaries.
Several components comprise the system under test of SXS. The SXS manages
the system parameters of the wireless settings used during experimentation. SXS also
manages each trial containing the modified preambles as part of the workload parameters.
Components within SXS include: the Ettus USRP–2921 and corresponding laptop that
manages the LabView software, the transceiver under test, and the wireless access
point. Other components in SXS include the wireless protocol, channel, access point
configuration, USRP configuration and wireless protocol analyzer.
This experiment restricts the scope of this research analysis to 802.11b, which employs
DSSS modulation. Techniques applicable to 802.11b differ from other protocols, such as
IEEE 802.11a, that may employ OFDM or FSSS instead of DSSS. Additionally, 802.11b
operates exclusively within the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band,
whereas other protocols may transmit in the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz range. Lastly, SXS operates
exclusively on channel 6 throughout the experiment.
3.2.4 System Services.
The SXS provides transceiver enumeration capabilities. SXS alters the number of bits
in the 802.11b preamble by injecting noise and replacing the RF signals that represent
bits in the preamble. Afterwards, SXS retransmits these RF signals that contain the
modified preambles to gauge packet response in each of the tested transceivers. Each
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experiment tests the transceivers ability to respond to packets with truncated preambles
over the course of 10 trials. The number of trials adequately illustrates how transceivers
fail at various stages during the experiment. Two transceivers fail with four or less bits
removed, four transceivers fail between five and nine bits removed and two transceivers
continued to transmit even with 10 bits removed. This approach exploits independent
hardware manufacturing in packet response to ICMP packets. Differences in packet
response suggests device classification is possible. By verifying the MAC addresses with
their observed performance during the experiment, this methodology creates an additional
layer of security that thwart the abuse of digital unique identifiers.
3.3 Experimental Design
Figure 3.1 diagrams the overall setup of SXS, including the individual components.
Section 3.3.1 addresses the workload parameters. Section 3.3.2 details the performance
metrics. Section 3.3.3 covers in depth the system parameters. Section 3.3.4 discusses
relevant factors applicable to this research.
3.3.1 Workload Parameters.
The primary workload parameters of SXS are the bits removed from the preamble.
This parameter affects all 802.11b wireless traffic since the preamble is prefixed during the
PLCP. The preamble allows the sender and receiver to perform network synchronization,
channel estimation and frequency offset functions. Figure 3.2 illustrates how the RF signal
appears after the preamble modification by injecting noise. The top data plot illustrates
a trial with one bit removed from the preamble, whereas the bottom data plot illustrates
a trial with two bits removed from the preamble. The noise region in the bottom data
plot is distinctly longer, since more bits are removed from the preamble. Removing initial
bits from the preamble decreases the two communicating transceivers window to complete
synchronization. Depending on hardware specifications, synchronization fails if too many
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Figure 3.1: System and Component Under Test Diagram
bits are removed. Section 3.3.2 addresses how performance metrics are derived from the
workload parameters within SXS.
3.3.2 Performance Metrics.
The overall response rate of the transceivers to the series of trials represents the
performance metrics used. SXS executes 40 total transmissions, which equals a single trial.
Each transmission contains a test packet with the modified preamble. The transmission
lasts for a duration of three seconds, buffered by an additional second before the next
transmission. This ensures that each transmission does not interfere with one another.
Conducting each trial with 40 transmissions ensures there exist adequate data to measure
the performance of the transceivers through statistical analysis. Device classification
compares the packet response rate of each of the transceivers throughout the experiment.
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Figure 3.2: Contrasting RF Signals Between One and Two Bits Removed From Preamble
In some cases, a transceiver under test fails to respond to all 40 test packets, which is
referred to as the“zero–barrier” threshold. This performance metric brings to light the fact
that independent manufacturing, while adhering to the standards defined by IEEE, leads to
devices that reach zero–barrier at different trials during the experiment.
Modifying the preamble provides multiple avenues to analyze transceiver performance,
beyond the observation of zero–barrier. As more bits are removed from the preamble prior
to complete failure, packet response decreases at varying rates. This provides an alternative
angle to profile the performance of a transceiver, especially in cases where zero–barrier oc-
curs during the same trial. Section 4.3.5 discusses this circumstance further in the case of
the Atheros transceiver. Each iteration within a trial results in a binary response of either
success (ACK) or failure (no response). This is a desirable characteristic for performance
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metrics as it enables a series of statistical computations to validate the data. Most success-
ful ACKs occur within half a second. However, transceivers have up to three seconds to
respond before failure. Section 4.4.1 further explores the results of packet response and
addresses the implications and assumptions derived from the experiments.
3.3.3 System Parameters.
The wireless network comprises the system parameters for this experiment. These
parameters affect the performance of SXS. The characteristics of the wireless network
include all supplemental hardware necessary to support the experiment. These include
the routers, cables, network interface cards and actual sender/receiver.
The primary system parameter of SXS is 802.11b. This protocol provides a low–
risk environment to implement the experimental design and adjust parameters as necessary
to test the hypothesis. All commercial hardware that are “Wi-Fi” compliant support the
802.11b protocol. The resources to manufacture hardware compatible with 802.11b are
cheaper than other wireless protocols, making it widely used in residential settings. Within
802.11b, the other system parameter that affects SXS include the channel of operation.
Channels indirectly impact the quality of the RF signal. If several users utilize a particular
frequency to transmit information, there exists a greater possibility of collisions. The
modulation mechanism is another property of the wireless network. Although 802.11b only
supports DSSS, other potential protocols may employ modulation schemes such as OFDM
or FSSS. In addition, the trials are conducted with standard long preambles. Lastly, the
wireless access point represents a system parameter as it an integral part of the wireless
network. However, for purposes of SXS, the access point remains constant since the
component under test is the transceiver.
The primary router passing traffic is the DLink N300 (DIR-655). The access point is
white-listed to only accept association requests from devices with a specific MAC address.
Further, the access point transmits on the 2.437 GHz band, operating on channel 6. The
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network line speed remains at 2 Mbps, however it is worth noting the preamble actually
transmits at 1 Mbps. The access points IP address is set to 192.168.0.1 and also assigns
the IP address of 192.168.0.197 to each transceiver during the experiment. Only one
transceiver is associated to the access point at any given time throughout the experiment.
Figure 3.3 depicts the 14 channels 802.11b contains. Each channel is 22 MHz wide
and spectrally overlaps with adjacent neighbors. Popular channels include 1, 6 and 11 since
none of these channels overlap with one another. The use of Channel 14 is prohibited in
the U.S. and Channels 12 and 13 contain certain restrictions, not relevant to this research.
SXS operates on channel 6 throughout this research.
Figure 3.3: Three Primary Channels Utilized in 802.11b [IEE99]
Each computer uses a wireless network interface card during the experiment. The
transceivers includes the Intel, Atheros and Broadcom wireless adapters. Some transceivers
are built into the computer controlling the component under test as internal wireless
adapters. Others, such as the Atheros 9001U-2NX (AirPcap) are USB adapters. These
transceivers are capable of operating in promiscuous or monitor mode. This facilitates the
capture of traffic, which is sent in three packet bursts using ICMP traffic. Only the first
ICMP packet contains the modified preamble, while the other two ICMP packets remain
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unmodified for control purposes. This allows for negative response and mitigates erroneous
transceiver profiling, due to legitimate packet loss in a contested medium.
Since data collection mostly occurs in a UNIX environment, it is preferable that the
tested transceivers have Linux driver support. More specifically, the Backtrack 5R3 suite
contains tools that monitor wireless traffic through Wireshark and connectivity to APs
through the wireless interface connection daemon. The only exception to this case rests
with the Atheros 9001U-2NX (AirPcap) wireless adapter. AirPcap operates in a Windows
environment and utilizes monitor mode.
3.3.4 Factors.
There are several factors in this research that have significant impact on the results
of the experiment. Table 3.1 lists the direct experimental factors with their corresponding
values. SXS contains three primary factors: preamble modifications, transceiver mode and
transceiver model.
The preamble modifications range from removing a single bit up to 10 bits. Each
successive trial removes an additional bit to gauge packet response from the tested
transceiver. Preamble modifications prove ideal over other sections of wireless traffic.
The preamble is encapsulated at the front during the PLCP. This characteristic eliminates
the need to traverse legitimate wireless traffic and approximate where to overwrite the RF
signals, covered in depth in Section 3.4.2. As the number of bits removed increases, the
hypothesis states that the transceiver responses rate will decrease.
Transceivers are the key factor within SXS, represented as the component under
test. Independent manufacturing yields behavioral inconsistencies while fulfilling services
required by 802.11b specifications. Tools such as “Macchanger” provide arbitrary MAC
address assignment in UNIX environments [Gnu04]. However, no current methodologies
demonstrate the ability to alter the physical characteristics of a transceiver to mimic another.
In other words, current open source software allows anyone to change a MAC address
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with a single command. However, spoofing physical properties requires hardware and
firmware modifications, lending itself impractical. This is critical, since the methodology
depends on the integrity of the transceiver under test and assumes no physical or firmware
modifications.
The only factor that encompasses a physical capability is the mode of operation,
observed by the two Atheros transceivers. Neither mode of operation (promiscuous,
monitor) introduces any significant anomalies. Similarly, while the majority of transceivers
operate within a laptop, the Atheros AR9001U-2NX is a Universal Serial Bus (USB)
wireless adapter.
Table 3.1: List of Experimental Factors
Factor Level
Preamble Modifications 1–10 Bits Removed
Transceiver Mode Promiscuous, Monitor
Transceiver Model
Atheros–Based
Broadcom–Based
Intel–Based
3.4 Experimental Methodology
Two of the most important factors include the transceivers model and preamble
modifications. Eight different transceiver models, manufactured by three different
companies allow for various comparative analysis. The packet response rates during
the experiment illustrate the characteristics of each transceiver. The trials consist of a
control ICMP echo request and two unmodified ICMP echo requests. In other words,
each transmission within a trial contains three total pings used to discover a live host on
the network. The first ping contains the preamble modification to account for a positive
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response. Two unmodified pings accompany the control ping to account for negative
responses. Table 3.2 lists the three possible outcomes when executing a single transmission:
Table 3.2: List of Possible Experimental Outcomes
Positive Response: Successful ACK to the modified ping.
Negative Response: Successful ACK to unmodified ping, but not to the modified ping.
Network Error: No ACK to either modified or unmodified ping.
Conducting this research in a live environment provides benefits and demonstrates
practicality if SXS is deployed onto an actual network. If the experiment is conducted
in an environment free of noise or other external interference, it increases the prospect of
differing packet response rates of the transceivers compared to their performance in a live
environment. This results in an increase in false positive events, decreasing the practicality
of SXS.
The experiment modifies preambles through a three-step process. First, the USRP
captures and intercepts the initial 802.11b traffic. Next, MATLAB analyzes and processes
the traffic as a binary file. Last, the USRP retransmits the modified packets to the
transceivers under test [KRM14]. Through replication, this process creates 10 sets of test
packets, each set increases the number of bits removed from the preamble.
3.4.1 USRP Packet Capture.
A machine associates and authenticates with the DLink N300 (DIR-655) wireless
router, as indicated in (1) of Figure 3.4. Wireshark, operating on the machine of
the transceiver under test, observes the ICMP packets transmitted to the access point.
Successful association and authentication enables data delivery services and the USRP
records and captures a series of ICMP echo requests (2), Figure 3.4. The RF signals
captured during the recording process pass through the 1 Gigabit (Gbit) Ethernet cable
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connected from the USRP to the managing host machine, an HP EliteBook 8570 laptop
(3), Figure 3.4. The binary file contains the instantaneous amplitude signatures of the RF
signals generated by the transmitted packets (4), Figure 3.4. The total transmission time to
record the RF signals is under one second, producing a 48 MB binary file.
Figure 3.4: Experimental Setup to Capture RF Signals
An HP EliteBook 8570 laptop contains the LabView software that manages the USRP.
LabView provides the graphical user interface to specify record and playback capabilities
for the USRP device. In addition, LabView offers visualization capabilities to view wireless
traffic and observe the quality of the signal. Labview assigns the USRP an IP address of
192.168.10.2. Since the tests occur on Channel 6, the carrier frequency is set to 2.437 GHz.
802.11b channels are 22 MHz wide. To ensure all 22 MHz of bandwidth transmits through
the USRP, the IQ rate is set to 25 Million samples per second (Msps). Each sample contains
an “I” and “Q” value, both of which are 16 bits in length. Therefore each sample is 32
bits. Transmitting 25 Msps results in 25, 000, 000(samples/second) ∗ 32(bits/sample) =
800Mbps. This requires a gigabit Ethernet port to successfully transmit the binary file
to the USRP. 25 Msps provides the best resolution on 802.11b. As a result of hardware
limitations between down conversions within the USRP and sustaining a 100 Mbps write
34
rate to the hard drive, 25 Msps is the maximum throughput achievable for this research
[Nat12].
3.4.2 Preamble Modification.
The unaltered 802.11b traffic contains a multitude of RF signals not significant to
this research. As shown in Figure 3.5, a Dell Precision T7500 desktop running MATLAB
software obtains the file via a USB thumb drive to perform traffic analysis and isolate the
transmitted packets. Preliminary traffic analysis examines the length of the RF signals to
identify the original ICMP packet. The captured ICMP echo requests range between 26,000
– 26,024 samples in length. The correct sequence number associated to the three ICMP
transmissions are 110, 111 and 112. Millions of samples comprise the vector. In order to
determine the start of an RF transmission, MATLAB runs a for–loop script that traverses
the binary file and returns the value of the sample that exceeds a predefined threshold. The
aggregate process of refining the raw RF signals to modified preambles occurs during steps
(6) and (7) in Figure 3.5. The next section further illustrates this process. Lastly, the HP
EliteBook 8570 receives the binary file via a USB thumb drive to prepare for retransmission
(8), Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Modifying the RF Signals
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Observing the instantaneous amplitude value using the Y–axis, MATLAB runs the
for–loop script illustrated in Figure 3.6 in a restricted region where RF traffic occurs to
find the index whose value exceeds 10,000
(
1 ∗ 104
)
. The restricted region is identified by
observing the x–axis of the data plots, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Instantaneous amplitude
values in the noise region range anywhere from ±9,000. RF traffic amplitude values range
anywhere from ±30,000. The for–loop script identifies when the amplitude values jump
significantly outside of the values observed within the noise region.
Figure 3.6: MATLAB Command and Workspace Windows Identifying RF Burst
Figure 3.7 illustrates the detection of an RF signal by contrasting the noise region
with the burst region. After identifying and isolating the unknown RF signals, MATLAB
creates a new binary file containing the sole RF burst. Wireshark monitors the interface
on the machine of the transceiver under test. When the USRP replays the new binary file
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created by MATLAB, Wireshark displays information about the unknown RF signal. If the
unknown RF signal is the ICMP echo request recorded by the USRP, Wireshark verifies this
by displaying a sequence number of either 110, 111, or 112. SXS repeats this process until
identifying all three ICMP packets that contain either 110, 111 or 112 sequence numbers.
This process is essential in determining the locality of the desired signals. MATLAB only
retains the RF signals of the transmitted ICMP echo requests to construct the test packets
for each trial.
Figure 3.7: MATLAB RF Burst Detection Plot
Next, MATLAB concatenates the three binary files into a single transmission. Each
transmission contains the three ICMP echo requests RF signals. The RF signals contain
padding before and after, as well as noise that is injected between each transmission.
The padding serves to provide between 100 – 150 milliseconds between the transmissions
of each ping, similar to a guard interval. This mitigates propagation delay, echoes and
reflections – side effects that 802.11b is sensitive to. Packet response is measured using
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Wireshark on the machine of the transceiver under test. Only the first of the three ICMP
packets contains the modified preamble.
3.4.3 Transceiver Configuration.
Each transceiver, except the AirPcap transceiver, connect to a standard commercial
D-link N300 DIR-655 wireless router. The AP assigns the same IP address to each of the
transceivers that connect, using 192.168.0.197. Further, the router only accepts association
requests from transceivers by white–listing the MAC address. A series of ping requests
verifies connectivity between the AP and the tested transceivers (#9), Figure 3.8. Recall in
Section 2.4.3, data delivery service occurs once a machine successfully authenticates and
associates to the network (State 3). The HP EliteBook 8570, containing each of the trials,
passes the binary file onto the USRP–2921 through the 1 Gbit Ethernet cable. Wireshark,
residing on the machine of the transceiver under test, monitors successful responses to the
modified packets that SXS transmits through the USRP (#10), Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Transmitting the Modified RF Signals
Figure 3.9 displays the graphical user interface for the USRP settings utilized
throughout the experiment. Packet replays occur at 2.437 GHz frequency, or channel 6
within 802.11b. Each set of packets resides on the HP EliteBook 8570, which passes
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the binary file through the Gbit Ethernet cable. The “TX Destination File” field specifies
the location of the test packets. The USRP and the receiving device rest between 6 – 12
inches apart, which mitigates packet loss during transmission. Furthermore, the USRP
configuration transmits test packets with 3 dB gain, which makes the detection of weaker
signals easier since it doubles the power.
Figure 3.9: USRP Configuration
Binomial confidence intervals of the packet response rates indicate the performance of
each transceiver for the designated trial. Confidence intervals are derived from the formula:
pˆ ± z1 −
α
2
√
pˆ (1 − pˆ)
n
(3.1)
pˆ is the probability of packet response. “z1”, taken at the 99% confidence interval, is
2.57. “n = 40”, which indicates the number of trials for each experiment. Since each trial
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executes 40 iterations of the modified IMCP packets, the central limit theorem has enough
data to illustrate a normal distribution. Section 4.3 further analyzes the results of individual
packet response rates.
3.5 Methodology Summary
This chapter covers the methodology used to discern differences in packet response as
a result of preamble modifications in 802.11b against a series of transceivers. The Ettus
USRP–2921 performs the initial capture of wireless traffic. MATLAB processes the raw
data capture to create each trial, which consists of the three ICMP packets. The USRP
retransmits a burst of ICMP echo requests, with one containing a modified preamble to
gauge the probability of packet response. Wireshark verifies connectivity to the Dlink
N300 DIR-655 router. Additionally, Wireshark monitors positive acknowledgement of
a transceiver to respond to each transmission. Binomial confidence intervals stratify
transceiver performance based on packet response.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the data collected during the
experiments. Section 4.2 details the Wald–Wolfowitz runs test to validate mutual
independence. Section 4.3 discusses the results of packet response from each transceiver.
Section 4.4 covers device classification results, Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests and the overall
summary of the experimental analysis. Section 4.5 summarizes the results of Chapter 4.
4.2 Validation of Mutual Independence
4.2.1 Wald–Wolfowitz Runs Test.
Before further analyzing the results of data collection, the experiment must pass the
test of mutual independence. The Wald–Wolfowitz runs test evaluates the randomness
of the data collected to determine mutual independence. This validation is essential to
identify factors that otherwise create dependency between each sequence of test packets
the transceivers respond to.
In the Wald–Wolfowitz runs test, the null hypothesis asserts that the two-valued data
set is randomly distributed and independent. This non-parametric statistical check analyzes
a run, which is defined as a sequence of identical values. In the context of SXS, identical
values refers to consecutive positive or negative responses to the modified ICMP packet
transmitted throughout the experiment. These values comprise a 40–element vector that
the Wald–Wolfowitz runs test assesses.
Using statistical analysis, the normal approximation produces the z–value, which
obtains the corresponding two–tailed P–value. The Wald–Wolfowitz runs test also accounts
for the variable probability of packet response. Trials that contain very high or low response
rates produce a smaller number of runs. For example, an Atheros AR928X performs with
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a 95% packet response rate out of 40 total transmissions. This indicates that the AR928X
transceiver successfully acknowledges 38 out of 40 packets. The maximum number of
runs possible given this scenario is five. Conversely, suppose the AR928X performs with
a 50% packet response rate during a different trial. The AR928X successfully responds to
20 out of 40 transmissions. The maximum number of runs possible is 40, assuming the
AR928X alternates between positive and negative responses. Since the packet response
rates amongst the transceivers vary during the experiment, these characteristics favor
conducting non–parametric tests through the Wald–Wolfowitz method.
4.2.2 Wald–Wolfowitz Application to SXS System.
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, a series of positive or negative responses equates to a
run. For example, suppose a fair coin is flipped 10 times, producing the following results
of “tails” (+): + + + – – + – + + –. n1 represents the number of tails and n0 represents the
number of heads. n equals 10, indicating the number of coin flips. The expected number of
runs is:
E (R) = 1 +
2n1n0
n
or E (R) = 1 +
2 (6) (4)
(10)
or E (R) = 5.8 (4.1)
Preliminary analysis concludes that E (R) = 5.8, which is very close to the actual
observed number of runs – in this example that equals 6. The Wald-Wolfowitz test
subsequently accounts for variance (σ2) that occurs around the expected number of runs.
The variance is:
σ2 =
2n0n1
(
2n0n1 − n
)
n2 (n − 1) (4.2)
The z–value used to find the corresponding two-tailed P-value requires the observed
number of positive and negative runs as well as the number of trials (n). Combined with
(4.1) and (4.2), this data produces the expected and observed number of runs and the
variance (σ2). The square root of the variance divides the difference between the observed
and expected number of runs, producing:
Z =
R − E (R)
σ
(4.3)
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Using actual observed data from the experiment, the Intel 6250 transceiver produces
13 runs in the first trial. Appendix H contains the values of the packet response rates for
trial 1. Testing for mutual independence requires the number of trials and the total for each
response (success/failure). Applying (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) to the Intel 6250, the transceiver
responded successfully 33 out of 40 total packet transmissions (82.5%), therefore n1 = 33,
n0 =7, n = 40. The expected runs calculates as:
E (R) = 1 +
(2) (33) (7)
40
= 12.55 (4.4)
The actual number of observed runs was 13, which suggests mutual independence
given the small difference between the expected and observed runs. Calculation of the
variance taken from (4.2) yields:
σ2 =
((2) (7) (33) ((2) (7) (33) − 40))(
402 (40 − 1)
) = (462 (422))
(1600 (39))
= 3.1244 (4.5)
The z–score is derived from (4.3) as:
Z =
13 − 12.55√
3.1244
=
0.45
1.7676
= 0.2545 (4.6)
Lastly, the corresponding P-value for a Z–score at 0.2545 from a two-tailed normal
approximation is 0.799. This strongly suggests that the data is mutually independent and
free of external factors that otherwise influence the results.
4.2.3 Mutual Independence.
Minitab Software produces the calculations for all transceivers to test for mutual
independence [Min14]. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 display the results for mutual independence
testing of the Intel, Broadcom and Atheros transceivers. The trial numbers correspond
to how many bits are removed from the preamble, and a “*” indicates that the tested
transceiver failed to respond to any of the 40 test packet transmissions, thus no test for
mutual independence is necessary.
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Table 4.1: Runs Test Calculations for Intel Transceivers (P–Value)
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 Trial 9 Trial 10
Intel 3945 0.595 0.343 0.389 0.43 0.981 0.259 0.611 0.684 0.819 *
Intel 4965 0.799 0.684 0.074 0.749 0.369 0.57 0.819 * * *
Intel 6205 0.17 0.799 0.576 0.283 0.399 0.35 0.702 * * *
Intel 6250 0.799 0.606 0.684 0.343 0.659 0.947 0.455 * * *
Table 4.2: Runs Test Calculations for Broadcom Transceivers (P–Value)
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 Trial 9 Trial 10
Broadcom 4311 0.799 1.000 0.455 0.944 0.701 0.341 1.000 0.667 0.646 0.799
Broadcom 4313 0.646 0.944 0.883 0.49 0.341 0.285 0.196 0.759 0.323 0.646
Table 4.3: Runs Test Calculations for Atheros Transceivers (P–Value)
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 Trial 9 Trial 10
Atheros 928X 0.576 0.819 0.819 * * * * * * *
Atheros 9001U 0.819 0.897 0.799 * * * * * * *
In summary, all tested transceivers pass the Wald–Wolfowitz runs test at a 1%
significance level to validate mutual independence. This statistical analysis strongly
suggests that the results collected from the tested transceivers are random. Section 4.3
analyzes the results of the individual transceivers and provides further observations that
indicate unique characteristics from packet response rates.
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4.3 Results and Analysis of Individual transceivers
4.3.1 Analysis of Intel–Based Transceivers.
The overall performance of the Intel transceivers suggests a steady response to
modified preambles up to four bits removed from the preamble. Overall, Intel transceivers
respond successfully 81% of the time during trials with up to four bits removed from
the preamble. Packet response declines between four and seven bits removed from the
preamble. During this stage, overall packet response with Intel transceivers fall to 67%,
then 59% after transmitting ICMP packets with six bits removed from the preamble. The
final stage of deteriorating packet response occurs when seven bits are removed from the
preamble. Most Intel transceivers fail after the eighth trial, with the exception of the Intel
3965 transceiver. All Intel transceivers fail entirely by the time ten bits are removed from
the preamble. The next section reports individual Intel transceiver results.
4.3.2 Results of the Intel 3945 Series transceiver.
This particular transceiver, housed inside a Dell Inspiron E1505 laptop, responded
most consistently to the ICMP echo requests throughout the experiment. Figure 4.1
illustrates how the transceiver responded greater than 80% of the time successfully to the
modified ICMP packets until 8 bits were removed. Packet response deteriorates after the
eighth and ninth bits are removed, falling to zero–barrier on the tenth bit.
The Intel 3945 transceiver differs in performance from the three other Intel–based
transceivers, strongly suggesting that intra–manufacturing is possible. Statistical analysis
through the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, covered in Section 4.4.3, confirms that the
performance between the Intel 3945 transceiver differs from other Intel–based transceivers.
4.3.3 Results of the Intel 4965 Series transceiver.
Out of the four different transceivers from the Intel family this research analyzes, the
Intel 4965 transceiver experiences the fastest rate of deterioration. The transceiver operates
within a Toshiba Satellite laptop. As Figure 4.2 displays, the packet response drops with
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Figure 4.1: Intel 3945 Packet Response Rates to Modified Preambles
three bits removed from the preamble. Packet response rates decline steadily between
the third and seventh bits removed, further supporting an inverse relationship between the
two factors. The transceiver reaches zero–barrier when eight bits are removed from the
preamble.
The Intel 4965 transceiver demonstrates unique characteristics apart from the Intel
3945 transceiver. The Intel 4965 transceiver fails to respond entirely when eight bits are
removed from the preamble, whereas the Intel 3945 transceiver continued to respond until
ten bits were removed from the preamble. However, the Intel 4965 transceiver shares the
same point of complete failure with the Intel 6200 series transceivers. Comparing when
two transceivers fail entire is insufficient to perform device classification, thus alternative
methods are required to enumerate the transceivers.
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests indicate clear separation with respect to transceiver
performance between the Intel 4965 and 6200 series, especially when analyzing packet
response rates with five and six bits removed. Graph analysis indicates no intersection
between the 4965 and 6200 series taken at the 99% confidence interval, with six bits
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removed from the preamble. This fact supports device classification to differentiate
between these transceivers. Furthermore, this observation relates back to the problem
statement that addresses Goal #3: Does there exist enough performance difference to
conduct device classification?
Figure 4.2: Intel 4965 Packet Response Rates to Modified Preambles
4.3.4 Results of the Intel 6250 and Intel 6205 transceivers.
The Intel 6250 transceiver, a more recent wireless adapter released in 2012, provides
wireless communications to a Dell Latitude E6520 series laptop. The behavioral properties
of the transceiver parallel packet response rates of the Intel Advanced-N 6205 wireless
adapter. The Intel Advanced-N 6205 resides inside an HP EliteBook 8570 series laptop.
Both transceivers experience an 80% packet response rate throughout the experiment until
the initial stages of decline when the fifth bit is removed.
Figure 4.3 displays the performance plots of the Intel 6200 series transceivers. The
most subtle differences in packet response with the transceivers occur between the fifth and
sixth bits removed from the preamble. The Intel Advanced-N 6205 transceivers plateaus
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briefly when the fifth and sixth bits are removed, holding steady at a reasonable 70%
response rate. However, the Intel 6250 exhibits a more gradual declination with response
rates at 77% and 60% respectively. When executing the seventh trial, packet response rates
drop significantly. The greatest separation in performance between the two transceivers
occurs during the third trial.
Figure 4.3: Comparison of the Intel 6250 vs. 6205 (99% CI)
4.3.5 Analysis of Atheros–Based Transceivers.
SXS tests two different Atheros transceivers in this experiment. Both transceivers ex-
perience similar rates of packet response, despite unique physical implementations. Atheros–
based transceivers contain the highest observable sensitivity to packet manipulation. More-
over, the Atheros transceiver demonstrates no gradual decline in packet response when bits
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from the preamble are removed. The AR928X and AR9001U transceivers exhibit an abrupt
drop after the third and fourth bits removed from the preamble.
4.3.6 Results of Atheros AR928X Series Transceiver.
The Atheros AR928X is an internal wireless adapter operating on a Dell XPS laptop.
Out of all the tested transceivers, the AR928X transceiver contains some of the highest
response rates when three or less bits are removed. The most notable feature Figure 4.4
illustrates is the abrupt failure that occurs when the fourth bit is removed. During the trial
with four bits removed from the preamble, the AR928X sent periodic ICMP echo requests
to verify connectivity to the AP due to the unexpected drop in packet response. These
results strongly differentiate from Intel transceivers that continue to respond well beyond
four bits removed from the preamble.
Figure 4.4: Atheros AR928X Packet Response Rates to Modified Preambles
4.3.7 Results of Atheros 9001U-2NX Series Transceiver.
The Atheros 9001U-2NX transceiver “AirPcap”, operates as a USB wireless adapter.
Aside from obvious physical differences, AirPcap differs by collecting all RF signals
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instead of the specific channel associated to the transceiver under test. Despite collecting
traffic on all channels with monitor mode, the AirPcap performs similar to the AR928X
series. Figure 4.5 demonstrates a similar performance trend of the AR928X transceiver.
Removing one or two bits from the preamble continues to yield high packet response rates.
However, removing the third bit causes a drastic drop, followed by complete failure by the
fourth removed bit from the preamble.
The Atheros transceivers contain very limited data to perform device classification,
due to their sensitivity. Fortunately, despite failing during the same trial, the AR928X and
AR9001U transceivers performed very dissimilarly. Where the AR928X transceiver holds
steady at a 98% response rate, the AR9001U drops to 18%. This observation confirms
the possibility of intra–manufacturer transceiver profiling. Section 4.5 further addresses
aggregate device classification.
Figure 4.5: Atheros AR9001U-2NX Packet Response Rates to Modified Preambles
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4.3.8 Analysis of Broadcom–Based Transceivers.
Between all transceiver SXS tests, Broadcom transceivers perform the most consis-
tently during all trials. Their performance differs substantially from Intel and Atheros
transceivers. Both transceivers continue to successfully respond to modified packets even
with 10 bits removed from the preamble. However, the transceivers perform analogous to
the Intel 6200 with respect to similarities. Despite the inability to disambiguate between
the Broadcom transceivers, the packet response rates demonstrate consistency between the
transceivers since they are nearly identical in physical implementation.
4.3.9 Results of the Broadcom 4311 and 4313 Transceivers.
In the Intel and Atheros–based transceivers, device classification analyzes when the
wireless adapter fails to respond to any of the 40 packets transmitted. Devices that fail at
the same point during trials require further analysis of packet response prior to total failure,
as the Atheros transceivers demonstrates. However the challenge with both Broadcom–
based transceivers stems from the fact that even with 10 bits removed from the preamble,
the transceiver continues to successfully respond to test packets. SXS needs to remove
more bits in order to obtain the zero–barrier for the Broadcom transceivers.
The Broadcom 4311 averages a 77% response rate overall during the trials. Figure 4.6
compares the results of the two Broadcom–based transceivers. An initial decline occurs
between the third and fourth bits removed. However, the Broadcom 4311 transceiver
recovers, hovering just under 80% between the fifth and ninth bits removed from the
preamble. This response pattern also occurs within the Broadcom 4313 transceiver. Initial
trials between the first and third bits removed result in a slight decline with the Broadcom
4313 transceiver. Similarly, the Broadcom 4313 recovers when the fourth and fifth bits
are removed. Although this particular transceiver maintains packet response rates between
60% and 80%, the overall average response rate of 68% is lower than observed with the
Broadcom 4311 transceiver.
51
Figure 4.6: Comparison of the Broadcom 4311 vs. 4313 (99% CI)
4.4 Device Classification Results
4.4.1 Analyzing Failure Rates.
There exist various thresholds throughout the experiment when transceivers fail to
respond to any test packets, listed in Table 4.4. These thresholds are valuable because they
demonstrate that the transceivers under test do not perform in identical fashion. However,
only 10 different trials enumerate the transceivers. In spite of the fact that SXS tests eight
different transceivers, the fact remains that several transceivers fail during the same trial.
Moreover, in the case of the Broadcom transceivers, both transceivers continue to transmit
despite 10 bits missing from the preamble.
Three out of the four Intel–based transceivers fail entirely when eight bits are removed
from the preamble. The Intel 3945 transceiver successfully responds until ten bits are
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Table 4.4: Experimental Trials Identifying “Zero–Barrier”
removed from the preamble. If a software defined radio utilizes the trial with eight bits
removed to enumerate an unknown transceiver, neither the Intel 6200 series nor the Intel
4965 transceiver respond. Assuming Intel represents the total pool of potential transceivers,
any positive response strongly suggests the unknown device belongs to an Intel 3945
transceiver.
4.4.2 Device Classification through Trial Analysis.
Analyzing when transceivers fail entirely results in reasonably adequate profiling
amongst manufacturers, but falls short when enumerating specific models. In order to
successfully classify device specific models, statistical analysis compares packet response
rates of the transceivers under test. When computing the expected number of runs to
determine mutual independence, the formula factors in the probability of packet response.
Similarly, trial analysis factors in circumstances where two different transceivers reach
zero–barrier at the same time.
Initial trial analysis compares any two transceivers performance for the duration of
the entire experiment. Table 4.5 compares the raw packet response rates between the Intel
3945 and Intel 6205 transceiver. The results of trial analysis produce a numeric vector that
represents the absolute difference between two tested transceivers for each individual trial.
From this vector, the greatest value identifies the trial where two transceivers differ the most
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in packet response. Depending on how great the difference, statistical analysis determines
whether or not device classification is possible based on a certain confidence level.
Table 4.5: Trial Analysis: Intel 3945 vs. Intel 6205
Conducting trial analysis between the two Intel transceivers illustrates similar
performance, until Trial 7. Despite the difference in zero–barrier between these two
transceivers, Trial 7 illustrates the greatest performance difference. Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests conclude higher accuracy rates using Trial 7, even though the Intel Advanced-N 6205
elicits three positive responses. Thus, trial analysis ignores when transceivers reach zero–
barrier.
Table 4.6 depicts the results of trial analysis between all tested transceivers and all
possible trials. As evidenced by the raw data, each cell within Table 4.6 contains the
value of greatest separation between each set of transceivers. The intersection between
the Intel 3945 and Intel 6205 contains the value 32, which references Trial 7 from Table
4.5. Similarly, all remaining transceivers undergo the same process. This identifies the
trial of greatest performance difference and to what degree the two transceivers differ.
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests use these values to determine whether device classification is
possible between any two transceivers.
Table 4.6 also illustrates a total of 28 independent comparisons. Most cases contain
values around 20 or higher. Two cases failed to meet this criteria. The first circumstance
occurs between the Intel 6250 transceiver and Intel Advanced-N 6205 series. The second
circumstance occurs between the Broadcom 4313 and Broadcom 4311 series. Both
cases involve transceivers not only from the same manufacturer, but also from the same
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transceiver family. While device classification is an explicitly stated goal, the observation
of similar performance supports the experimental design that validates transceiver response
rates.
Table 4.6: Trial Analysis: Packet Response Rate Difference
When comparing the performance of the Intel 6200 series, the transceivers only
differ in response at most by five packets. Similarly, comparing the performance of the
Broadcom–based transceivers yields a difference of nine packets. Both circumstances
produce the greatest difference during Trial 3. Although trial analysis fails to successfully
identify the specific transceiver based on the aforementioned packet response rates, the
results eliminate the majority of other potential transceivers. This largely satisfies the
device classification goal.
4.4.3 Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test Results.
A two–sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test enables in depth analysis to
characterize statistical differences in packet response rates. While trial analysis indicates
clear separation in packet response in most cases, K–S tests provide mathematical proof
at a certain confidence interval to differentiate between transceivers. The two–sample K–S
test compares the empirical distribution function of the two samples and returns a P–value.
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The empirical distribution function is:
Fn (x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
IXi ≤ x (4.7)
Where n = 40 for this research, as it indicates the number of independent observations
in a trial. IXi is the indicator function, which deviates to 1 if IXi ≤ x, otherwise 0.
In terms of the K–S test, the null hypothesis asserts that the samples are drawn from
the same distribution. The two distributions under test assume equality unless proven
otherwise. If the null hypothesis holds true, the two distributions are considered equal,
which occurs when device classification fails. Alternatively, if enough evidence exists to
reject the null hypothsis, clear separation exists to enumerate the transceiver. Additionally,
the K–S demonstrates favorable properties for general applications since the test accounts
for differences in the shape of the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). The
comparison of the empirical CDF between the two samples is:
Dn,n′ = supx | F1,n (x) − F2,n′ (x) | (4.8)
Each sample is represented from 4.7 by F1,n (x) and F2,n′ (x). Dn,n′ is the absolute
maximal separation, or supremum, of the two samples.
The P–value derives from the comparison of the empirical CDFs between each sample.
A low P–value (0.05 or less) strongly suggests that the two transceivers differ. Alternatively,
a P–value greater than 0.05 suggests a strong possibility that the two distributions are
comparable. Important to note, a P–value greater than 0.05 does not mean that the two
distributions are the same. It simply means there does not exist enough evidence to suggest
otherwise, more commonly referred to in the statistical sense of “not different”.
Table 4.7 lists the corresponding P–values for all transceivers under test . Analyzing
the Intel 3945 transceiver, results of the K–S tests indicate uniqueness against all other
transceivers. The Intel 3945 transceiver results in P–values equating to 5.26E-13 against
the Intel 4965 transceiver. The Intel 6200 series performs more closely to the Intel 3945
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transceiver, as evidenced by the marginally increased P–values of 1.54E-11 and 7.36E-11.
Identical values found in Table 4.7 are general indicators where at least one transceiver fails
to respond entirely. The Broadcom Broadcom 4311 exhibits this trait, since Broadcom
transceivers continue to successfully acknowledge ICMP packets with 10 bits removed
from the preamble. No other transceivers successfully respond during Trial 10 except
Broadcom.
Table 4.7: Results of K–S Tests and Corresponding P–values
K–S tests provide supplementary data, when comparing the empirical CDFs between
the Intel 6200 series and Broadcom transceivers. In the former, with a maximum packet
response difference of five, the Intel 6200 series produced a P–value of 0.9135. This is the
highest observed value in the entire experiment. This equates to a maximum performance
difference of 12.5%. Figure 4.7 offers an alternative illustration to plot the performance
of the two Intel 6200 transceivers. The linear trends mirror one another, in addition to
individual transceiver performance during the trials.
Visually, the graph in Figure 4.7 illustrates three key features. Both transceivers
exhibit an 84%–86% packet response rate for the first four trials. Initial degradation occurs
on the fifth trial, then both transceivers fail when eight bits are removed from the preamble.
Linear trends between the two are difficult to disambiguate and further support the findings
of the K–S test.
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Figure 4.7: Performance and Linear Trend: Intel 6205 vs Intel 6250
The second example where device classification fails occurs when comparing the
Broadcom–based transceivers to one another. Similar to the Intel 6200 series transceivers,
the greatest separation occurs during the third trial. This observation concerning the
third trial is merely coincidental. This does not lend itself to the conclusion that similar
performing transceivers differ the most during the third trial. The Broadcom transceivers
differ during the third trial by nine successfully received packets, a 22.5% separation. While
this trend is almost twice the difference between the Intel 6200 series, the resulting P–value
stands at 0.2634, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two transceivers are the
same.
Table 4.8 illustrates the trials from which performance differs the most. Atheros–
based transceivers exemplify considerable performance difference, especially since both
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transceivers fail to respond beyond three bits removed from the preamble. The heightened
sensitivity to the modified packets results in analysis based more on the transceiver in
question than the Atheros transceiver. In other words, since the Atheros transceivers fail
early during trials, the amount of data available to compare is limited. As a result, when
comparing the Atheros–based transceivers to any other Intel or Broadcom transceiver, the
trials where performance differs the most are identical. Table 4.8 illustrates that 6 out of 13
instances of trial analysis involving Atheros transceivers found Trial 4 contains the greatest
performance difference.
Conversely, the Broadcom transceivers performance suggests higher tolerance to
modified packets. This phenomenon also leads to a particular trial that best demonstrates
the performance difference between the Broadcom transceivers. As Table 4.8 indicates, 9
out of the 13 trials point to Trial 10 where packet response rates differ the most. These
observations help construct the optimized packet taxonomy, covered further in Section 4.5.
Table 4.8: Potential Trials to Develop Packet Taxonomy
4.4.4 Device Classification Packet Taxonomy.
The results of zero–barrier inspection, trial analysis and K–S tests validate distinct
characteristics in 26 out of 28 comparisons between the tested transceivers. Furthermore,
the table matrix from Figure 4.16 indicates a series of trials that are useful for constructing
the flowchart for device classification. Certain trials prove more useful than others.
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Utilizing the most effective trials optimizes the device classification flowchart, minimizing
the required number of packets to transmit and test unknown devices.
4.4.5 Monte Carlo Simulations.
An optimized flowchart depends on three key factors. First, utilizing the data
illustrated in Table 4.8, identify the key trials that provide test environments where the
transceivers differ. Second, identify the number of packets to test and branch, while
ensuring 99% accuracy or greater. Lastly, in the event of trials where the possible
transceivers all result in at least one positive response, a threshold to branch. This numeric
value must preserve the integrity of ensuring 99% accuracy. Figure 4.17 lists the cumulative
enumeration accuracy rates for all tested transceivers, covered extensively in the next
sections.
As shown in Table 4.8, only 5 out of the 10 total trials are necessary to complete the
flowchart. Aside from the initial branch of the flowchart (Trial 8), Figure 4.16 references all
other trials at some point where transceiver performance differs the greatest. These include:
Trial 3, Trial 4, Trial 6 and Trial 10. Depending on the results of transceiver performance
during a trial, there exist varying levels of minimum packets to transmit and ensure high
fidelity. Lastly, Trial 3 and Trial 6 require a certain threshold established to discern the
behavioral pattern most congruent with the correct transceiver.
The formula utilized to obtain the minimum packets to test during select trials is[
1 − (1 − p)n
]
≥ 99%; where “p” equals the probability of response and “n” represents
the minimum number of test packets. “n” must be sufficiently high enough to maintain
99% accuracy in the worst case scenario. Fortunately, device classification occurs with a
minimum of two trials and a maximum of three.
The Atheros transceivers require three total tests. Both transceivers fail entirely with
four bits or more removed from the preamble. If an unknown device operates as an Atheros
transceiver, the optimized flowchart gradually enumerates the device by reducing the
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number of bits removed until the third test (Trial 3). This process systematically eliminates
the Broadcom and Intel transceivers as potential transceivers under test in as little as 18
packets. Assuming an Atheros transceiver operating consistently with the findings of this
experiment, accuracy rates approach 100% during the first two tests.
Trial 3 introduces the first of two circumstances where positive and negative responses
fail the enumeration process. Monte Carlo simulations, computed as
f (x) =
∑x
k=0
n!
k!(n−k)! pk (1 − p)n−k combines with the cumulative binomial distribution
probability to provide objective criteria and accurately classify the unknown device. In the
case of Trial 3, 15 packets represents the border that separates the performance expected
between the AR928X and AR9001U transceivers. The next section illustrates a series of
scatterplots and Monte Carlo simulations that explain the math behind the selection of 15
packets to discern between the transceivers.
The Intel 6200 and Intel 4965 transceivers fail to respond in Trial 8, similar to
their Atheros counterpart. However, during Trial 4 all three Intel transceivers succeed
in responding to at least one packet. The odds of an Intel 6200 series responding at
least once successfully during Trial 4 is practically 100%. Using the lesser responsive
transceiver (Intel 6250), with a packet response rate of 87.5% during Trial 4, enumeration
accuracy rate is
[
1 −
(
1 − 3540
)10]
=
[
1 −
(
9.3x10−10
)]
or nearly 100%. The Intel 4965
responded less successfully during Trial 4. Subsequently, enumeration accuracy computes
to
[
1 −
(
1 − 2040
)10]
=
[
1 −
(
9.7x10−4
)]
or 99.902%.
The third test finalizes the enumeration process by transmitting 40 packets using Trial
6. This test requires the most packets out of any other, since the Intel 4965 exhibited
a very low response rate with six bits removed from the preamble. Again, using the
lesser responsive transceiver of the Intel 6200 series, enumeration accuracy stands at[
1 −
(
1 − 2440
)40]
=
[
1 −
(
1.2x10−16
)]
or nearly 100%. The accuracy rate to discern an
Intel 4965 during Trial 6 is
[
1 −
(
1 − 540
)10]
=
[
1 −
(
4.8x10−3
)]
or 99.521%. In the case
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of Trial 6, 13 packets represent the border that separates the performance expected between
the Intel 6200 series and the Intel 4965 transceiver. The cumulative enumeration accuracy
rate for the Intel 6200 series is practically 100%, while the Intel 4965 transceiver equals
99.423%.
Lastly, device classification between the Broadcom 4300 series and Intel 3945
transceivers requires two tests. The cumulative binomial confidence distribution suggests a
minimum of 99.993% accuracy for classification under Trial 8. This accuracy rate between
the Broadcom 4300 series derives from the least responsive transceiver for the test (Trial 8),
the Broadcom 4313 transceiver. This transceiver’s packet response rate is 28/40, therefore
the formula computes as
[
1 −
(
1 − 2840
)8]
=
[
1 −
(
6.5x10−5
)]
or 99.993%. The Intel 3945
transceiver performs very similarly at 29/40, therefore the enumeration accuracy rate for
Trial 8 computes as
[
1 −
(
1 − 2940
)8]
=
[
1 −
(
3.3x10−5
)]
or 99.997%.
The accuracy during Trial 10 for an Intel 3945 transceiver is 100%, since the
transceiver fails to respond to any of the test packets. Thus, the cumulative accuracy
when the transceiver under test is an Intel 3945 equals 99.997%. Similarly, the Broadcom
transceiver responds fairly consistently even with 10 bits removed from the preamble.
The accuracy rate of the Broadcom 4311, with a packet response rate of 33/40, equals[
1 −
(
1 − 3340
)4]
=
[
1 −
(
9.4x10−4
)]
or 99.906%. The BCM 4313 enumeration accuracy
computes as
[
1 −
(
1 − 2840
)4]
=
[
1 −
(
8.1x10−3
)]
or 99.190%. The cumulative accuracy
rate for the Broadcom 4311 is 99.904%, while the accuracy rate for the Broadcom 4313 is
99.183%. Meanwhile, the Intel 3945 transceiver cumulative enumeration accuracy rate is
99.997%.
4.4.6 Scatterplot Diagrams: Trial 3, Trial 6.
Five possible trials enumerate a transceiver, three of which branch solely on either
positive or negative responses. However, the remaining two trials test a set of transceivers
that all elicit a positive response. MATLAB processes a series of Monte Carlo simulations
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Table 4.9: Overall Transceiver Accuracy Rates
to produce scatterplot diagrams. Each plot of data represents a single iteration, for a total
of 100 iterations per transceiver. These diagrams offer a visual representation to illustrate
where an appropriate boundary exists to separate transceiver performance. Appendix I
contains the code for the MATLAB script.
Trial 3 results indicate 100% accuracy to perform device classification when the
transceiver under test is an AR928X transceiver. Similarly, the cumulative binomial
distribution asserts a 99.998% accuracy rate when the device in question is an AR9001U
transceiver. These results meet the ≥ 99% criteria. Figure 4.8 displays the scatterplot
diagram for Trial 3, which indicates clear separation between the AR928X and AR9001U
group. In fact, the odds of conducting Trial 3 and obtaining a packet response rate between
37.5%–62.5% are practically zero, since preceding trials branch in a manner to factor out
all other potential transceivers. Figure 4.8 illustrates the results of the scatterplot diagram.
Accordingly, 20 packets represents the appropriate threshold that separates the performance
of the AR928X and AR9001U transceivers.
As discussed in the previous section, Trial 6 maintains the accuracy rate ≥ 99%. Since
the pool of potential transceivers all respond at least once during the trial, the branching
criteria does not hinge on a positive or negative response. Monte Carlo simulations produce
a scatterplot diagram, however the area separating the two groups is substantially smaller.
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Figure 4.8: Scatterplot Simulation (Trial 3)
Figure 4.9 contains unique properties that illustrate the scatterplot for Trial 6. First,
the Intel 6200 series represents the transceiver with a superior packet response rate than
the Intel 4965 transceiver. Both groups contain outliers that factor into where best to
determine the appropriate threshold. The Intel 4965 simulations contain a single outlier on
the 37th iteration, where the simulated packet response rate is 220% greater than observed
during the experiment. Similarly, the Intel 6200 series contained an outlier on the 29th
iteration, where the simulated packet response rate falls to 37.5%, or 15/40. The observed
packet response rate during the experiment holds steady at 60%, or 24/40. Despite the two
extremes between the samples, the greatest simulated value of the Intel 4965 transceiver
does not breach the lowest simulated value of the Intel 6200 series. Accordingly, 13 packets
represents the most appropriate threshold that separates the performance of the Intel 6200
series and Intel 4965 transceivers.
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Figure 4.9: Scatterplot Simulation (Trial 6)
4.5 Summary
In summary, five strategically selected trials optimize the packet taxonomy to
enumerate the tested transceivers. Highly accurate results with the Intel 3945 and
Broadcom transceivers are achievable in as little as 12 packets. All transceivers under test
meet cumulative enumeration accuracy rates greater than 99%. Scatterplots and Monte
Carlo simulations illustrate appropriate thresholds concerning trials where positive and
negative responses fail. Figure 4.10 presents the final packet taxonomy to successfully
enumerate all transceivers.
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Figure 4.10: Full Device Classification Flowchart
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the overall conclusions drawn from the research. Section 5.2
discusses whether or not the goals of this research were satisfied. Section 5.3 presents the
relevance of this research and impacts on network security. Lastly, Section 5.4 lists areas
for future work and potential goals.
5.2 Conclusions of Research
5.2.1 Goal 1: Determine Capability to Replay Modified 802.11b Traffic.
The transceivers under test successfully demonstrate the ability to respond to
replay packets transmitted through an arbitrary waveform generator. Software defined
radios, such as the NI Ettus USRP–2921, can successfully observe and collect 802.11b
wireless traffic. MATLAB stores, handles and modifies the binary vectors representing
instantaneous amplitude signatures of the wireless traffic. MATLAB data plots provide
visual representation to distinguish between channel noise and wireless traffic. Lastly,
MATLAB isolates the data and enables retransmission through the USRP to verify ICMP
packet response. Network protocol analyzers such as Wireshark confirm retransmission, as
indicated by the sequence number in each successful packet response. The aforementioned
validates the physical capability of Goal 1.
5.2.2 Goal 2: Determine Transceivers Performance Differences.
The data collected during the experiment indicates a clear difference in performance
between the tested transceivers. The transceivers exhibit varying levels of sensitivity and
fail entirely during different trials. Wald–Wolfowitz runs test validate mutual independence
of the data and subsequent statistical analysis further supports the evidence to draw causal
conclusions. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests observe behavioral differences between each of
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the tested transceivers, with the exception of the two cases discussed in Section 4.4.3.
Despite the two isolated circumstances where absolute device classification fails, the
experiment successfully enumerates 26 out of 28 observations through trial analysis. This
largely satisfies the criteria of Goal 2 and offers valuable observations towards future work
the next section covers.
5.2.3 Goal 3: Determine the Optimized Packet Taxonomy.
The optimized flowchart builds upon the conclusions drawn from Goal 2. Key
trials provide the branches that enable the classification of devices while minimizing
the required number of packets to enumerate the transceiver. Monte Carlo simulations
identify the number of packets to transmit during all tests to ensure 99% or better
accuracy. Scatterplot diagrams provide visual observations in circumstances where positive
and negative responses fail to successfully enumerate an unknown device. In addition,
scatterplot diagrams also identify the appropriate threshold to branch during Trial 3 and
Trial 6. The cumulative binomial distribution function quantifies the probability of each
branch based on the packet response rate of the potential transceivers in question. The
results indicate that all transceivers under test satisfy device classification accuracies of
99% or better. Optimizing trial analysis to perform device classification is achievable
under two seconds, factoring in the exchange of packets and computing the results of the
transceiver under test. Overall, statistical analysis supports high fidelity rates, low packet
transmission requirements and satisfies Goal 3.
5.3 Significance of Research
Data emanation, weak encryption and the ability to operate free of cables results in a
breeding ground for malicious activity. Current to date, there exist default security practices
that fail to harden a wireless access points upon initial configuration. Weak encryption
standards, default administrative passwords and poor security practices make cyber attacks
easier to execute – costing hundreds of millions annually in intellectual property theft
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[Pon12]. Therefore a series of security practices have been developed over the years to
provide defense–in–depth.
MITM attacks exist as a result of no authentication requirements upon receipt of
an ARP packet. These threats continue to affect LANs when users obtain the ability to
arbitrarily assign their MAC address to the communicating interface, such as their wireless
adapter. As a result, related research efforts have put forth unique methodologies to
introduce stronger security practices to combat MAC spoofing.
RSSI–based models analyze the received signal strength indicator for a specific
transceiver. The mesh approach to triangulate an accurate proximity to the transceiver fails
when operating in a mobile network. Subsequently, sequence number rate analysis (SNRA)
methodologies attempt to address the mobility issue by employing a series of heuristics to
discern subtle gaps in sequence numbers. These gaps result when an attacker incorrectly
guesses the next sequence number, triggering a possible alert. However, SNRA models fail
to address circumstances when a client moves out of range of the network and returns at
a later time. SNRA techniques compromise the integrity of what the model is intended to
prevent by making exceptions, such as the wrap–around effect when the sequence resets
from 4095 to 0. Lastly, OUI prefix validation provides minimal security against users that
change their MAC address without any regard to the validity of the prefix. Prefix validation
is easily defeated by using legitimate MAC addresses.
This research differs from RSSI, SNRA and prefix validation models. This
RF fingerprinting techniques embrace mobile networking by exploiting subtle design
differences that lead to differing packet response rates. Preamble modification offers an
additional layer to the defense–in–depth of LANs by reducing the surface area an attacker
exploits. The significance of this research provides alternative network defense options to
combat MAC spoofing. The act of changing unique digital identifiers strongly suggests
potential malicious activity due to MITM, ARP cache and DNS poisoning attacks that
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follow. SXS detects deviations from the expected packet response rates in a given network
environment, limiting or denying access to the rogue transceiver. Automating the detection
of potentially malicious devices and restricting access to the network until transceiver
verification creates significant barriers that thwart would–be attackers. Even circumstances
where device classification is not absolute, the exclusion of other potential transceiver types
reduces the attack surface to masquerade as a legitimate user.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
This research extends the efforts put forth to produce an RF fingerprinting technique
in the IEEE 802.15.4 low–rate wireless Personal Area Network (PAN). The methodology
in 802.11b strongly suggests the potential for future research in three key areas. First,
addressed in Section 2.5.3, 802.11b utilizes standard long preambles. Future research into
other protocols that utilize short preambles may yield evidence that illustrates transceiver
differences based on preamble modifications. In addition, 802.11b utilizes DSSS. Future
research efforts may find behavioral differences when conducting a similar methodology in
OFDM or FSSS–based modulation implementations. Lastly, 802.11b came to fruition in
1999. Most commercial hardware is backwards compatible with this legacy protocol. This
experiment demonstrated successful results, validating the RF fingerprinting technique.
Future work may also include testing this same methodology against more current
protocols, such as IEEE 802.11g, 802.11n, 802.11ac or even 802.11ad.
Exploring future research in RF fingerprinting techniques offers enhanced device
classification capabilities. There exists the potential that two similarly performing
transceivers operate differently, when analyzed in a different context. This suggests the
possibility of expanding preamble modifications through the use of multiple software
defined radios by layering the experiments in sequence. As an example, a sequence
of experiments may analyze wireless protocols in order: 802.11a, 802.11g, 802.11n.
Alternatively, sequential ordering may incorporate modulation schemes such as: DSSS,
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FSSS, OFDM. Lastly, protocols that operate with the functionality of using short and long
preambles increase the factor by two.
5.5 Summary
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions with recommendations concerning future research.
In addition, this chapter contrasts the SXS methodology against other related research
efforts. Lastly, this chapter also addresses the success of each stated goal and discusses
the relevance of this research with respect to network security.
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Appendix A: Performance of Atheros AR9001-U2NX (AirPcap)
Figure A.1: Observed Raw Data: Atheros AR9001U-2NX (AirPcap)
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Atheros AR9001U-2NX (AirPcapJ 
-
Dell Precision 4500 Series 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive response; 0 de notes ne gative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix B: Performance of Atheros AR928X
Figure B.1: Observed Raw Data: Atheros AR928X
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Athe ros AR928X 
-
Dell XPS Serie s 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive response; 0 denotes negative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix C: Performance of Broadcom BCM 4311
Figure C.1: Observed Raw Data: Broadcom BCM4311
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8roadco m 8CM 4311 
-
Dell XPS Serie s 
-
1 de note s ~ ositive re sponse; 0 de note s ne gative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
7 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
8 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
10 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
12 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
14 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
15 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
17 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
19 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
21 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
22 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
23 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
24 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
27 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
28 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
29 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
30 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
31 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
33 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
34 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
36 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
40 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Appendix D: Performance of Broadcom BCM 4313
Figure D.1: Observed Raw Data: Broadcom BCM 4313
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8roadco m 8CM 4313 
-
Dell Precision 4500 Serie s 
-
1 de notes ~ os itive response; 0 de notes ne gative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
5 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
6 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
7 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
8 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
12 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
13 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
14 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
15 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
16 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
17 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
18 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
19 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
20 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
22 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
23 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
25 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
26 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
27 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
28 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
29 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
30 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
31 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
32 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
33 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
34 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
36 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
37 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
39 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
40 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Appendix E: Performance of Intel 3945
Figure E.1: Observed Raw Data: Intel 3945
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lnte l 3945 
- Dell lns piron E1505 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive response; 0 denotes negative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
8 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
10 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
11 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
13 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
14 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
17 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
18 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
21 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
24 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
30 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
33 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
34 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
35 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
36 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
38 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
39 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
40 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Appendix F: Performance of Intel 4965
Figure F.1: Observed Raw Data: Intel 4965
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lnte l 4965 
-
Toshiba Sate llite 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive response; 0 de notes ne gative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
18 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
32 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix G: Performance of Intel 6205
Figure G.1: Observed Raw Data: Intel 6205
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lnte l 6205 
- HP Elite8ook 8570 Serie s 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive response; 0 de notes ne gative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
8 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
13 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
17 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
19 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
25 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
26 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
27 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
34 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
36 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
38 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
39 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
40 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix H: Performance of Intel 6250
Figure H.1: Observed Raw Data: Intel 6250
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lnte l 6250 
-
Dell latitu de E6520 Serie s 
-
1 de notes ~ ositive respons e ; 0 de notes negative response 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
6 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
7 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
18 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
21 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
23 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
25 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
33 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
36 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
38 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
40 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix I: MATLAB Monte Carlo Script
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t i mes_t hreshol d_occurred = 0; % Count s how many t i mes r and() i s bel ow t hreshol d 
for i = 1 : 35 % Thi s was used for Tr i al 31 r equi r i ng 35 t est packet s to be sent 
x = r and() ; % Gener ate a r andom val ue for x 
i f x < . 175 % Packet r esponse r ate of AR 9001-U 2NX duri ng Tr i al 3 
t i mes_t hreshol d_occurred = t i mes_t hreshol d_occurred T 1; 
end 
end 
% The i f s tatement can be s t ruct ured to r ead "i f x >= . 875" as well 
% Si nce t he AR 9001-U 2NX had a l ow packet r esponse r ate 1 < . 175 % i nt ui t i vely i s mor e cl ear 
% ' i ' i s i ncr ement ed up to t he opti mal number of t est packet s r equi r ed to 
% achi eve > 99% accuracy 1 NOT up to t he number of t r ans mi ssi ons i n each t r i al 
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